Public Administration Review CPAR Civil service promotion (CSP) is a key construct linked to other operations of public human resource management. However, it has received scant attention. This study uses second-order confirmatory factor analysis to test the theoretical perspectives of CSP. It then uses multiple regression to test how individual demographics influence public managers' and public employees' perceptions of CSP. The stratified samples were extracted from Taiwan's cabinet-level ministries. The results demonstrated a significant difference in civil service promotion structure between public managers and public employees. The results also indicated that the respondents' demographics are associated with differences in CSP between public managers and public employees. The findings and implications were discussed.
INTRODUCTION
T he mechanism of civil service promotion (CSP), which varies among civil servants, plays a critical role in public personnel management. Practitioners and academics are more willing to talk about its problems, including favoritism and personal relationships, than about operations with CSP. Despite its importance, little evidence exists to support our assumption. This issue still needs more empirical confirmation. That is, it is important to identify its antecedents, characteristics, and consequences in terms of theory and practice to strengthen employee motivation and improve organizational performance (Beehr et al., 2004; Ferris et al., 1992; Ma, Tang, & Yan, 2015) .
Promotion is a means for filling vacancies in higher ranks by selecting employees from the lower ranks. A higher salary usually accompanies a promotion. Candidates are selected for promotion based on character, ability, qualifications, experience, ranking with other candidates, individual performance, personnel policies (e.g., diversity, race), and other criteria (Tharenou, 2001) . Ideally, the candidate selected for promotion must perform well and be able and ready to assume more demanding duties. All eligible candidates receive equal consideration. However, not only merit, but favoritism and the personal preferences of a senior manager can influence a promotion (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; Lovrich et al., 1980) . In addition, organizational members may disagree on what matters in career advancement (Beehr et al. 2004 ). If public employees perceive that work performance plays an important role in CSP, they are likely to work harder to achieve a promotion. However, if they regard favoritism and factionalism as the key to promotion, they may concentrate on currying favor with their influential managers (Ma et al., 2015) . Although public managers and employees are assumed to have different perceptions of promotion, most of them come from their positions and roles toward promotion. This difference is rarely supported by empirical studies which have only sporadically and unsystematically been discussed. Exploring how public managers and public employees contrast, then setting forth explicitly the parameters for looking at the promotion practices is part of our research purpose.
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory was an appropriate explanation of the link between public manager-public employee and public human resource management practice. Good leader-member exchange may lead to tangible benefits such as promotions and bonuses, and/or intangible benefits such as interesting work assignments and greater control over workload (Yeo et al., 2015) . 1 Public manager-public employee (leader-member) exchange encourages positive employment experiences that lead to better organizational performance. From this perspective, public managers and public employees are expected to have similar viewpoints of and goals for public human resource practices such as promotion. The public sector also has a principal-agent problem when a principal (public manager) creates an environment in which an agent's (public employee's) incentives fail to align with its own interests. 2 In public human resource management, public managers can design employment contracts (e.g., personnel laws, compensation, promotion, welfare) to connect public employees' behaviors as closely as possible to organizational missions and performance. From this vantage point, public managers and public employees may have different goals for public human resource management. In addition, previous efforts on public management issues such as public service motivation (PSM), emotional work, red tape, goal clarity, and job satisfaction may focus on street-level bureaucrats or all employees; however, public managers and public employees may think, behave, and perceive differently. Our first research question is: Which characteristics of the CSP structure were reflected from the perceptions of public managers and public employees?
Demographic characteristics of public bureaucracy may influence the results of civil service promotion. Demographic characteristics were controlled for the empirical studies in public human resource management, and some research has found that studying demographic factors as main variables can provide more interesting stories on issues such as diversity management (Choi, 2012; Choi & Rainey, 2010) and generational studies (Tang et al., 2012) . In practice, seniority, education, and gender are often considered important factors of promotion in the civil service. The structural, cultural, and organizational barriers that prevent women from entering senior and executive positions are known collectively as "the glass ceiling" (Sabharwal, 2013) . These arguments lead to our second research question: Do respondents' backgrounds influence their perceptions on CSP across public managers and public employees? Data were collected using a self-reported survey in which we combined stratified random sampling with respondents' grade levels with a search of the Central Personnel Administration of Taiwan's Executive Yuan (the Cabinet) to issue a public document to request the sampling respondents to fill out the survey. The respondents were asked about their perceptions of the civil service promotion structure in their agencies. Second-order confirmatory factor analysis was used to analyze the CSP structure.
Several contributions to public administration can be expected from this study. The findings contribute to theories about promotion, performance appraisal, and work motivation, building on studies in public human resource management and on managing modern merit systems (Durant, Kramer, Perry, Mesch, & Paarlberg, 2006; Hays & Kearney, 2001; Ingraham, 2006; Woodard, 2005) . In terms of the method, multiplegroup second-order confirmatory analyses confirmed the CSP structure. In practice, this research will track the promotion of civil servants. This study will compensate for the dearth of research on promotion practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. This paper examines the hypotheses regarding the relative significance of CSP from the perceptions of the perceptions and evaluates whether personal demographics influence the CSP. The study then presents the research design, the research sample, variable measurement, and analytical method. This is followed by the findings, such as two-sample t-tests, multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis, and 1 Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Theory states that leaders develop an exchange with each of their subordinates, and that the quality of these relationships influences subordinates' responsibility, decisions, and access to resources and performance (Deluga, 1998; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Meng & Wu, 2015; Yeo, Ananthram, Teo, & Pearson, 2015) . 2 The principal creates incentives for the agent to ensure they act as the principal wants. This includes setting up financial or moral incentives set up to encourage the agent to act in a particular way to avoid information asymmetry. One of the best ways to protect this kind of agency costs to lay out the incentive contract. multiple regression. Finally, we present the discussion, implications, and conclusions.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES TESTING
Decisions about the promotion of public personnel are directed toward technical and management goals but rarely toward employee aspirations. Public managers focus on developing an instrument that accurately measures performance in order to identify a candidate's strengths and weaknesses before deciding whether or not to promote that person. As the theory and the practices suggest, personnel decisions like promotions are connected to individual performance; thus, the procedure to determine employees' promotion must truly reflect the candidate's competences. The decision must be able to withstand scrutiny by public employees and public managers. However, Beyer, Stevens, and Trice (1980) found that personal, role, and organizational predictors of how federal managers in the United States perceived promotion criteria varied by the status that those managers had already achieved. Their results supported the idea that merit is not important for promotion unless adequate criteria are available and used for judging performance.
Some studies refer to several influential factors in CSP. Beehr and Taber (1993) constructed four career advancement channels: exceptional performance, reliable performance, personal characteristics, and luck or favoritism. Beehr et al. (2004) latter merged these into two channels: performance and nonperformance. Performance is based on how well the employee performs his or her work role. Nonperformance consists of demographics, favoritism, and luck. It is an internally controlled promotion channel because employees can work harder or smarter to improve performance, but non-performance comprises externally measured factors that are largely beyond employees' control (Ma et al., 2015) . Ma et al. (2015) distinguished four perceived promotional channels based on respondents' preference for performance or guanxi: merit-based promotion, guanxi-oriented promotion (e.g., favoritism or nepotism), ambidextrous (merit-based and guanxioriented factors), and fatalistic, such as race, sex, and luck (neither merit-based nor guanxi-oriented). Different factors influence civil service promotion, and this study distills CSP into the main factors of structural characteristics, legislation, favoritism, organizational justice, and individual performance. The following sections discuss their components and developments.
Structure of Civil Service Promotion Structural characteristics.
The structural characteristics relevant to promotion reflect the decisions that match persons and jobs in addition to the arrangement and attributes of positions within the organizational work structure (Johnsrud, 1991) . These are job design, job contents, official grade, and so on. CSP depends on performance appraisals, but promotions have unique characteristics. For example, only a few people can be promoted because of the limited number of positions (Beehr et al., 2004) . The bureau's authority structure is an important factor of CSP, and the other structural characteristics, constraints, and conditions such as civil service regulations and regional differences in experience with merit systems (Halaby, 1978) . Understanding the structural dimensions of the promotion process requires identifying the behavior and practices of decision makers who match people to jobs (Johnsrud, 1991) . No research was found to discriminate the levels of structural characteristics of CSP between public managers and public employees. As discussed above, LMX and principal-agent theory inferred the perceived similarity or difference of CSP between public managers and public employees. Therefore, the following hypothesis was made: H1: Public managers and public employees may perceive the similarity or difference on structural characteristics of civil service promotion.
Legalization. The legal system for personnel promotion is based on existing laws and regulations, procedures, and provisions, including internal or external promotion set at a fixed ratio and the establishment of rapid promotion. In addition, the promotion review committee evaluates the career advancement of the potential candidates, including work experiences, personal characteristics, work performance, and agency needs. The agencies also set the standards for recruitment in order to satisfy citizens' needs, achieve organizational goals, and improve organizational performance. Although no empirical research has discussed possible differences on this issue between public managers and public employees, legalization is the basis of promotion in the civil service. As discussed, LMX and principalagent theory implied that the similarity or difference of legislation related to CSP between them. We then make the following hypothesis: H2: Public managers and public employees may perceive the similarity or difference on legislation of civil service promotion.
Favoritism. Favoritism has always been a theoretical and practical concern in CSP. Favoritism is a nonperformance means of being promoted. Employees do selfish things to earn a promotion (Ferris et al., 1996) . Favoritism in the promotion process and results were associated with political and human factors, including personal relationship, nepotism, and the higher official's preferences. Organizational practices can influence such political behaviors, which can negatively influence organizational harmony and functioning (Beehr et al., 2004) . Bach and Veit (2018) found that both political selection criteria (partisan loyalty) and meritocratic selection criteria (political craft, managerial competencies) were considered to the chance of promotion for the highest public office in the German federal ministerial bureaucracy. However, ministers are likely to trade off political partisan loyalty for other qualifications. That is, individuals who are loyal to a governing party are more likely to be promoted than nonloyalists. In practice, public managers tend to deny the existence of favoritism. This research further intends understand the perceived similarity or difference of favoritism related to CSP between public managers and public employees; then makes the following hypothesis: H3: Public managers may perceive less favoritism in civil service promotion than public employees.
Organizational justice. Organizational justice is the equity factor of the promotion process. The fair treatment of employees in their work mainly includes procedural fairness and distribution fairness: 1. Procedural justice relates to employees' perceptions about the fairness of the process and procedures of the promotion rules and system (Beehr et al., 2004) . Procedural fairness is judged by the fairness of the promotion decisions. 2. Distributive justice relates to the way employees are compensated fairly for their work (Meng & Wu, 2015) . It also pertains to the fairness of the allocative outcome on promotion; for example, the promotion decisions, peer acceptance, and assessment process are open (Yeo, et al., 2015) .
Both of justice types seem to be affected by promotion practices in one's organization, making promotional justice a promising factor in promotion systems (Beehr et al., 2004) . If employees regard personnel decisionmaking as unfair and unrelated to their competence or performance, their morale is likely to suffer. Unfair promotion perceptions may also strengthen favoritism, damage organizational cohesion, and decrease morale (Ma et al., 2015) . Promotion fairness has been revealed to exert a positive effect on organizational commitment, with employees who perceive the promotion process as fair more likely to work hard (Lemons & Jones, 2001 ). Ferris et al. (1992) found support for a link between promotion system characteristics and organizational promotion justice. Although researchers have discussed the fairness of promotion in public management, there have been no studies of public managers and public employees. As discussed above, LMX and principalagent theory implied the perceived similarity or difference of organizational justice related to CSP between public managers and public employees. We make the following hypothesis: H4: Public managers and public employees may perceive the similarity or difference on organizational justice of civil service promotion.
Individual performance. Government organizations, increasingly oriented to service delivery, were modeled after corporations in which personnel selection and promotion were presumably based on merit (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) . Individual performance is the result of personal effort and work performance. The results of personnel promotion fully reflect the employee's work that colleagues will actively seek to undertake important business in order to be promoted. Promotion committees can pay the same attention to the evaluation information of the individual candidates. Promotion decisions are usually made in accordance with the rules. A good promotion system can attract talented people to work in government, to work hard, and improve administrative efficiency (Willoughby, 1927) . Encouraging employees to work hard should be established through the system to implement the "duties" and "ability" as the core of the performance appraisal. This system also needs to establish key performance indicators for employees and organizations and determine the assessment of quantitative and qualitative standards. Then, the agency regularly tracks and reviews the implementation of organizational goals and staff performance, which provides information on the promotion. The principalagent theory implied that public managers tended to strictly appraise individual performance more than public employees. Previous research also found that school managers perceived performance expectations more than school employees (Favero et al., 2018) . This leads to the following hypothesis: H5: Public managers may be stricter than public employees to appraise individual performance of civil service promotion. That is, public managers tended to evaluate lower scores than public employees on individual performance of CSP.
Demographic Factors
Prior research has established individual characteristics such as gender, education, tenure, age, and rank as salient influences on the advancement of employees (Beehr et al., 2004; Johnsrud, 1991; Ma et al., 2015) .
1. Gender. It is important to know if large subgroups such as males and females differ in the way they perceive and react to personnel decisions (Beehr et al., 2004) . The prevalence of gender discrimination and the glass ceiling has made gender a key factor in promotion (Beehr & Juntunen, 1990) . Women are underrepresented in the government workforce. They may ascribe their underrepresentation to the traditional culture of masculinity rather than to issues of personal capacity and performance (Ma et al., 2015) .
2. Age and work tenure. Elderly public employees with lengthy career experience are usually more familiar with the promotion process than are their younger colleagues, and thus may be more likely to attribute promotion to non-performance factors. Younger public employees without rich career experience, in contrast, may naively consider merit and performance to be the key determinants of promotion (Ma et al., 2015) .
3. Education and work tenure. Theorists of human capital conceptualize education and experience as investments in personal capital that are returned in the form of wages (Johnsrud, 1991) . Well-educated public employees are more likely to be promoted.
4. Rank. Higher-ranking public employees are more likely to ascribe their career advancement to work competence and performance, but their subordinates are not (Beehr & Juntunen, 1990; Ma et al., 2015) . We, therefore, expect individual demographics to influence perceptions of civil service promotion in public managers and public employees. Then the following hypothesis was made: H6: Individual demographics influence public managers' and public employees' perceptions of promotion in the civil service.
Research Context
Taiwan's civil service system combines position and rank classification. Position classification groups jobs by occupational type and skill level. Compensation is based on the competencies needed to perform the job. In contrast, rank classification is based on personal qualifications, such as academic credentials or seniority (Klingner, Nalbandian, & Llorens, 2015) . In Taiwan, position classification applies to primary, junior, and senior officials. Rank classification covers from Grade 1 to Grade 14. In summary, Taiwan's public personnel system consists of primary (Grade 1 -Grade 5), junior (Grade 6-Grade 9), and senior (Grade 10-Grade 14) levels.
There are two ways to become civil servants. One way is to pass the "Elementary Examination for the Civil Service," "Junior Examination for the Civil Service," or "Grade Four Civil Service Special Examination." Applicants for primary-level positions cannot be promoted to junior-level and senior level, but those who pass "Elementary Rank Promotion Examination," or complete "Training for Civil Servants of Elementary Rank Seeking Promotion to Junior Rank" can be promoted to junior-level (no higher than Grade 8).
The other way is to recruit junior level civil servants who must pass "Senior Examination for the Civil Service III," (Grade 6) or Senior Examination for the Civil Service II," (Grade 7) or "Grade Three Special Examination" (Grade 6). Someone who has qualified to promote senior-level civil servants need to pass "Senior Rank Promotion Examination," or accept " 
4.
Procedure. The personnel department should list the qualified personnel and the agency head approved according to the orders of the promotion grades and the relevant information; then reviewed and submitted the list to the "Selecting and Reviewing Committee for the Civil Service Promotion." After the committee has met, the agency head can choose one of three candidates; or more than two of the candidates which depend on the promotion positions. If the agency head did not agree to the list, he can return it and the agency should adopt another promotion procedure according to the law and regulation.
5.
Exemption. Some positions should be exempted from the procedure of promotion such as agency head, deputy agency head, secretary general, deputy secretary general, high officials, and senior-level Grade 12 officials of foreign embassies and consulates (representative offices), and institutions.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Survey, procedures, samples. Because we had no questionnaire, we followed Dillman's (2007) tailed design to operationalize the questions linked to the factorial structure of civil service promotion (i.e., professional focus group, pretest). Data were collected from 32 Cabinet-level ministries of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in October 2010. Stratified random sampling was used to ensure that our sample adequately represented selected junior (rank 6 -9) and senior (rank 10 -14) public managers and Cabinetlevel career civil servants, thereby producing samples with fewer sampling errors.
The first step in drawing a stratified random sample is to classify the population into career civil servants of the 32 ministries based on ministry characteristics. We draw the samples by taking an equal percentage of members from two strata in each ministry: public managers and public employees (O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008) . With the assistance of the Taiwan Central Personnel Administration, we surveyed these public managers and employees. Established procedures were used to enlist cooperation and reduce nonresponse bias (e.g., telephone follow-ups, return envelopes, ensuring respondents' anonymity, an informative advance letter) (Dillman, 2007; Fowler, 2009 ).
Ultimately, 2180 responses were returned, yielding a high response rate of 72.67%. The response rates of individual ministries were also above 60%; rates approaching 50% are considered adequate (Babbie, 1998) . Finally, 977 of the respondents were public managers; the rest were public employees. By the paired samples t-test, there is no significant difference in number between the samples and the populations (t =0.4, df=29, p = 1). Table 1 shows the characteristics of these two groups in terms of gender, seniority, rank tenure, and educational degree between public managers and public employees. In addition, the paired samples t-test and chi-square test indicated no significant difference between the population and the sample in terms of demographic factors such as gender, tenure, and educational levels between public managers and public employees.
Variable measurement. As previously indicated, the criteria of civil service promotion consist of five latent variables: structural characteristics, legislation, favoritism, organizational justice, and individual performance. Appendix 1 shows how the survey items reflect each latent variable and include descriptive statistics and t-tests. All these survey items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 7 for strongly agree.
Structural characteristics. This factor was defined as the decisions and results of civil service promotion depending on structural characteristics. Three survey items in Appendix 1 make up this factor. The sample question is "Tabulation of grades influences the operational performance of the civil service promotion." After running a confirmatory factor analysis, we found one item to be a poor indicator for measuring this factor (i.e., standardized factor loading = .212 < .5). Therefore, we deleted this item and two items made up this factor with a composite reliability of .917 and average variance extracted (AVE) of .847.
Legislation. Promotion in the civil service depends on the current law, procedure, and regulation. Four survey items measured this factor. The sample questions include "The Grading Criteria of Promotion for Employees meets the agency's hiring needs." We only include the last two survey items to measure this factor in Appendix 1 because the first two items did not have sufficient factor loadings contributing to this factor. The remaining items yielded a composite reliability of .854 and AVE of .746.
Favoritism. This study defines favoritism as the decisions and results of civil service promotion that depend on personal relationships. Four survey items in Appendix 1 measure this factor, including the sample question: It increases the opportunities to promote to a higher position through a personal relationship or the upper official's pressure. The composite reliability and average variance extracted for this factor were .870 and .628, respectively.
Organizational justice. This factor was defined as the decisions and results of civil service promotion depending on impartiality and equity. Four survey questions in Appendix 1 made up this factor, including the sample question: The criteria for promotion are fair and ensure that the right person advances to the appropriate position. The composite reliability and average variance extracted for this factor were .907 and .709, respectively.
Individual performance. This factor was defined as the decisions and results of civil service promotion depending on individual performance. Four survey questions in Appendix 1 comprised this factor, including the sample question: My colleagues positively take charge of important affairs to earn promotions. The composite reliability and average variance extracted for this factor were .868 and .630, respectively.
Individual demographics. We include several demographic variables, including Gender: male=1, female=0; seniority=continuous variable; work tenure=continuous variable; education: 1=bachelor, 2=master, 3=doctorate; rank: junior=1, senior=0.
ANALYTICAL METHOD
In addition to using descriptive statistics to understand the distributions of the respondent samples and research variables, data were analyzed using two sample t-tests to compare whether the means of public managers and employees differ on the dimensions of CSP. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS 21.0 produced the measurement model that yielded factorial loadings for the survey items, and composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE) for the latent variables. We then used multiple-groups CFA to contrast the inequality or equality across two groups of public managers and employees in terms of CSP (Kline, 2005) . The advantage of multiplegroup CFA analysis is that, through the specification of cross-group equality constraints, 3 the group differences across public managers and employees on any individual parameter can be tested. Therefore, the fit of the constrained model can be compared with that of the unconstrained model without the equality constraints with the chi-square difference statistic (Kline, 2005) . Finally, we averaged each summated scale of each factor that has sufficient reliability and validity. Multiple regression analysis was used to understand which elements of the respondents' backgrounds were related to each dimension of CSP and to explore the forms of these relationships. The variance inflation factor (VIF) quantified the severity of multicollinearity, showing that one respondent's background variable is highly correlated with all of the remaining background variables in a multiple regression analysis.
FINDINGS
The results were produced with CFA for each factor, descriptive statistics, t-tests, multiple-group CFA, and multiple regression.
CFA, descriptive statistics, and T-test. As shown in
Appendix 1, the composite reliability of each latent variable was larger than .7, indicating that the content of these indicators was consistent for constructing the best possible unit of analysis for the factor (Nunnally, 1978, p. 245 ). In addition, the average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor was greater than .5, and the standardized factor loading was larger than 0.5. The satisfied composite reliability, the AVE, and the standardized factor loading indicate the evidence of sufficient convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) . In addition, the square root of each factor's AVE shown in table 2 has a greater value than the correlations with other latent constructs, demonstrating sufficient discriminant validity (Fornell & Cha, 1994) .
The t-test used to compare the mean differences for public managers and employees for each item of civil service promotion yielded t-values with the probability of .05. For individual composite factor shown in Table  3 , public managers are significantly more likely than public employees to evaluate high scores in structure characteristics, legislation, organizational justice, and individual performance. However, there are opposite results of favoritism between them. unconstrained model provides a better fit than the constrained model because of its smaller χ2 values. The change of 132.217 in χ2 did not exceed the critical value of chi-square (52.192) with 37 degrees of freedom, and the difference in χ2 was not statistically significant (p<0.001). The chi-square difference test suggested that the constrained model is significantly worse than the unconstrained model. We can conclude that the parameters may not be equal between them. The unconstrained model is, therefore, the preferred model for presenting our findings.
Multiple-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Second-order confirmatory factor analysis. Figures  1 and 2 show the values of standardized coefficients for five second-order confirmatory factor analyses between public managers and employees, separately. The coefficient presented in boldface in table 2 is the standardized factor loading for survey items specified to measure the public managers' and employees' models. The following section focuses on the unconstrained model (figures 1 and 2) . The squared multiple correlations (R 2 ) of the endogenous variables provide additional support for the explanatory effect when combining survey items on individual factors making up civil service promotion (CSP). As indicated in Figure 1 , among public managers, the composed items reflect only .4% of structural characteristics, 78.4% of legislation, .209% of favoritism, 98.2% of organizational justice, and 97.4% of individual performance. Among public employees, as shown in figure 2 , the composed items reveal .6% of structural characteristics, 69.6% of legislation, 26.7% of favoritism, 97.3% of organizational justice, and 98.9% of individual performance.
In public managers' model, the path parameters of the second-order factor of all but the structural characteristics are statistically significant (p<0.01; see figure 1 ). Within this model, legislation has positive reflections on civil service promotion (standardized coefficient=.885, p<.001), but favoritism (standardized coefficient= -.457, p<.001) negatively reflects on civil service promotion. Furthermore, the emphasis on organizational justice (standardized coefficient=.991, p<.001) and individual performance (standardized coefficient=.987, p<.001) positively affected civil service promotion. However, no statistically significant relationship was found between structural characteristics and civil service promotion.
In the public employee model, figure 2 reveals that the parameter estimate for structural characteristics and favoritism contributing to civil service promotion is -.078 (p<.01) and .517 (p<.001). However, the parameter estimate for the path linking legislation and civil service promotion is .834 (p<0.001).
In addition, the path coefficient linking organizational justice and civil service promotion indicated a positive relationship (standardized coefficient=.93, p<.001), as did the parameter estimate for the path linking individual performance and civil service promotion (standardized coefficient=.995, p<.001).
Multiple Regression
In the following analyses, respondents' demographics were used as the variables by obtaining separate regression equations for each CSP factor. Comparisons of the results for respondents' backgrounds on different CSP factors are shown in the standardized coefficients presented in table 4 to facilitate understanding of their relationships. Table 4 indicates that variance accounted for R 2 ranges from 7% to 14% for public managers and from 6% to 13% for public employees. The explained variances of the facets of civil service promotion for public managers and employees models were somewhat small, but the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each model was below 10, indicating the absence of a multicollinearity problem that may obtain a numerically accurate estimator. Table 4 demonstrates that the rank level is the strongest predictor among the facets of CSP. As reported, for public managers, the results show considerably better Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 ()standard error perception for junior level than for senior status to positively predict structural characteristics (β=0.082, p<0.05) and favoritism(β=0.229, p<0.001), but negatively predict organizational justice (β=-0.245, p<0.001) and individual performance (β=-0.283, p<.001). Junior-level public employees had a lower perceived evaluation than the senior employees in organizational justice (β=-0.098, p<0.01) and individual performance (β=-0.104, p<0.01), but higher scores in favoritism (β=0.118, p<0.001). Compared to senior public managers, junior public managers perceived higher scores on organization structure (β=0.082, p<0.05) and favoritism (β= 0.229, p<0.001), but the negative scores on legislation (β=-0.194, p<0.001) , organizational justice (β=-0.245, p<0.001), and individual performance (β=-0.283, p<0.001) for public manager and public employee. Public managers with long job tenure also had lower evaluations on legislation (β=-0.083, p<0.05) and individual performance (β=-0.096, p<0.05). However, this prediction differs for perceiving structural characteristics (β=0.110, p<0.05) and legislation (β=-0.115, p<0.05) for public employees. Education was a positive predictor of importance for structural characteristics of CSP for both public managers (β=0.107, p<0.01) and public employees (β=0.068, p<0.05), but a negative predictor of legislation for public employees (β=-0.062, p<0.05). Table 4 presents the results on statistical insignificance as fair competition rules in the career advancement process. Taiwan's current promotion system is in line with the requirements of organizational justice that the respondents expected.
For favoritism, the respondents rated the higher scores on the preferences of the senior officials, nepotism, and personal relationships for either public managers or public employees. This evidence shows that an atmosphere of favoritism hangs over the promotion system, which seems to be commonplace in public agencies. However, public managers and public employees also hold positive attitudes toward other aspects of the promotion system such as its structural characteristics, legalization, organizational justice, and individual performance.
Public managers know the plans, implementations, and evaluations of their agencies; public employees see only their individual cases. Therefore, public managers are more likely to have a clearer sense of their agency's operations. The other reason for this phenomenon is that public managers are more sensitive to the promotion system because of their duties and responsibilities. Public employees may have this concern in their daily workloads more than promotion.
The evidence of convergent validity obtained with the composite reliability, factor loadings, and AVE for five subscales of CSP was adequate. We are confident that the sample used in this research differs meaningfully from the managerial roles in terms of civil service promotion. As expected, favoritism had a pronounced negative effect contributing to civil service promotion in two groups, as shown in figures 1 and 2. In addition, legislation, organizational justice, and individual performance were positively correlated with civil service promotion between two types of career civil servants. It is inversely significantly correlated with structural characteristics in public managers, but not public employees. Previous studies have found that performance was more important to promotion than either technical skills or seniority. Many federal managers in the US at least believe in the merit principle and that it can motivate better of the gender and seniority variables. Respondents' seniority did little to influence their perceptions toward the facets of civil service promotion based on the results in table 4. Another finding of interest is that none of the variables concerning the type of criteria used in CSP was significantly poor as judged by the gender predictor based on the results in table 4. The demographic variables, employee gender, and seniority did not obviously significantly predict promotion in this study. The results contrast with the previous findings, for example, the relationship between gender and organizational justice related to affirmative action (Beehr et al., 2004) .
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study determined how employees in Taiwan's central government perceived the criteria used for their own promotions. It also investigated possible predictors of those perceptions between public managers and public employees. This study found that if the survey items include the positive aspects of CSP, such as structural characteristics, legislation, organizational justice, and individual performance, the means of public managers' perceptions were higher than those of public employees. Otherwise, if the survey items are related to the negative aspect of CSP, the means of public employees' evaluations were higher than those of public managers. Public managers seem to embrace positive aspects of CSP, but public employees tend to distrust the operation of CSP. The more likely explanation rests in the nature of job positions and hierarchical bureaucracy, which mark the perceived differences in performance information and decision making.
Respondents hold a higher score on the fairness of the promotion for public managers than public employees. Such findings following the previous study pointed out that the public managers favored the fairness of the promotion. In government agencies, promotion is an effective way to motivate staff. In the process of promotion, fairness is very important to the working environment (Song, 2008) . An appropriate promotion system should be consistent with the operational needs of the agency, but also can be used performance. Seniority alone was seen as a much less important factor in promotion than either performance or technical skills (Beyer et al., 1980) . This study also confirms seniority did not significantly influence CSP between public managers and public employees.
The results of the multiple regression demonstrated that respondents' gender, job tenure, education, and rank influence their perceptions of civil service promotion, but seniority does not. While the results provide some support for our hypotheses, they underscore the significance of CSP factors. However, CSP criteria are ultimately shaped by the socioeconomic and cultural environment (Halaby, 1978) . Our findings recalled previous studies in China that public employees who realize that both merit and guanxi matter to their promotion are more pragmatic about and perceptive of current personnel management practices (Ma et al., 2015) .
Our evidence demonstrates that public managers and public employees have significantly contrasting perceptions toward civil service promotion. The findings imply that not all public human resource management practices can highlight the motivating role of job satisfaction and encourage workers to approach tasks without direct supervision (Theory Y). Because of the potential perceptive differences between public managers and public employees, these may incur other possible conflicts and cultivate an unhealthy organizational culture. In practice, given public managers and public employees' different perceptions of promotion, different strategies could be used to improve satisfaction with the civil service system. One of these strategies would be to build a trustworthy civil service promotion system. If decentralized and flexible, an agency can consider seniority and individual performance, making it support the agency's goals and policies. Furthermore, when setting up the criteria of promotion, the "level of duties", "nature of duties," and "business needs" should be considered along with the results of performance appraisals and organizational performance measurements.
In the long run, a performance-oriented promotion system should set up a complete training program, so that promotion, training, and experience can be an effective combination to improve the potential development and the work ability of the talents. Anyone who wants to be promoted should have the requisite qualifications and training for which the agency should make the rules according to the characteristics of the duties and the purposes of the agency.
CONCLUSION
The present study may facilitate understanding the potential conflux and conflict of civil service promotion between public managers and public employees. Future research on reactions to civil service promotion might follow this comparative approach. This study found perceived differences of CSP between public managers and public employees. These perceived differences may also appear elsewhere in public management practices, such as public service motivation, and performance management. Previous studies on public management issues used entire samples rather than the separate groups of public managers and public employees, of which these studies came to the wrong conclusions, and recommend the biased suggestions because they did not provide detailed information.
This study also has several limitations. For example, it used subjective rather than objective criteria of civil service promotion; however, this is not unusual. Beyer et al. (1980) indicated that the number of subjective criteria used is an important predictor of how significant performance is seen for promotion by both high-and low-level managers and how important technical skills are seen by high-level managers. Future research should be conducted on the basis of objective data so that causal inferences can be made (Meng & Wu, 2015) . The other limitation is that this study only considers CSP via the traditional departmental hierarchy; however, considering moving between different ministries and agencies may be the other important factor for CSP. Future research should highlight this criterion (Bach & Veit, 2018) .
APPENDIX 1. Descriptive Statistics, T-Test of Survey Items of the Civil Service Promotion between Public Manager(N=997) and Public Employee(N=1183)
Appendix 1 shows that the tabulation of grades influences the operational performance of CSP, the item of structural characteristics, and a significant difference was found between public managers (mean= 5.09) and public employees (mean=4.94) (t=-2.90, p<.01). In terms of legislation, two survey items (item 3 and item 4) appeared to have significant differences between public managers and employees (t=-1.96, p<.05 and t=-4.35, p<.001, respectively). Public managers had higher scores than public employees on these two survey items measuring the legislative aspect of CSP. For the aspect of favoritism, four survey items (items 5, 6, 7, and 8) also marked significant differences between two groups, but their perceptions toward all survey items were higher among public employees than those among public managers. For the four items of organizational justice, public employees showed a significantly lower evaluation than public managers. For example, public employees indicated lower perceptions than public managers on openness of CSP (item 11) and impartiality of CSP (item 12). Furthermore, public managers tended to have higher evaluations than public employees regarding items of individual performance for CSP, such as decision (item 16), results (item 13), accountability (item 14), and individual efforts (item 15). When we looked at the rank of survey items in Appendix 1. The front orders from perceptions of public managers centered on the dimensions of structural characteristics and favoritism. Similarly, the perceptions of public employees centered on favoritism and structural characteristics. Otherwise, the last orders from the perceptions of both public managers and employees were individual performance and legislation.
Factor
Item Survey Items
Public Manager Public Employee T-values Mean (SD) Rank Mean (SD) Rank
Structural Characteristics 
